While mass panic (and/or violence) and self-preservation are often assumed to be the natural response to physical danger and perceived entrapment, the literature indicates that expressions of mutual aid are common and often predominate, and collective flight may be so delayed that survival is threatened. In fact, the typical response to a variety of threats and disasters is not to flee but to seek the proximity of familiar persons and places; moreover, separation from attachment figures is a greater stressor than physical danger. Such observations can be explained by an alternative "social attachment" model that recognizes the fundamentally gregarious nature of human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight occurs, the latter can be understood as one aspect of a more general affiliative response that involves escaping from certain situations and moving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be objectively safe. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly on the social context and especially the whereabouts of familiar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their physical presence has a calming effect and reduces the probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combining the factors of perceived physical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that encompasses a wide spectrum of collective responses to threat and disaster. Implications of the model for predicting community responses to terrorist attacks and/or use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed.
less, given the September 11, 2001, attacks on as inappropriate or as highly intense fear or flight, instances of panic are difficult to identhe World Trade Center and Pentagon, the immediately subsequent anthrax letters, and tify in practice. The judgment of panic is usually made retrospectively, especially if serious widespread continuing concerns regarding population behavior in the event of terrorist loss of life occurred, but what may be considered inappropriate, excessive, irrational, or attacks using weapons of mass destruction (Durodié & Wessely, 2002; Hyams, Murphy, highly intense by observers may not be so judged by the participants themselves (Fore-& Weesely, 2002; Levy and Sidel, 2003) , a fresh appraisal of the literature on collective man, 1953; Mawson, 1978 Mawson, , 1980 SchochSpana, 2003; Sime, 1980; Swartz, 1980 ; Wood, responses to threat and disaster is needed.
The review indicates that the typical 1972). For instance, rushing for the exits in a structural fire may be the only rational course response to a variety of physical threats is neither "fight nor flight" but affiliation-that is, of action to take (Lazarus, 1966) . Hence, the decision to label instances of collective flight seeking the proximity of familiar persons and places, even though this may involve apas panic is arbitrary. Common symptoms of intense fear, such as anxiety, nausea, vomiting, proaching or remaining in a situation of danger; indeed, separation from attachment figand dizziness, can be normal reactions to abnormal events (Lacy & Benedek, 2003 ; Pastel, ures is a greater stressor than physical danger itself. Such observations can be explained by 2001). This discussion focuses on individual and collective flight behavior, recognizing that an alternative, "social attachment" model of collective behavior under threat, a model that such behavior can assume varying degrees of intensity. recognizes the fundamentally social nature of human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relatively rare instances where flight does occur, the latter can be understood as
THE CAUSES OF GROUP FLIGHT
one aspect of a more general affiliative response that involves escaping from certain sitAccording to the classical "entrapment theory" of mass panic (e.g., Chandessais, 1971 ; uations and moving toward other situations that are perceived as familiar, but which may Fritz & Marks, 1954; Fritz & Williams, 1957; Janis, 1971; Janis et al., 1955; Killian, 1972 ; not necessarily be objectively safe. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends mainly Mintz, 1951; Quarantelli, 1954 Quarantelli, , 1957 Quarantelli, , 1977 Smelser, 1963; Turner, 1964) , flight occurs if on the social context and especially the location of familiar persons (attachment figures); people believe that 1) major physical danger is present or imminent, and 2) escape routes that is, their physical presence is calming and reduces the probability of flight-and-affiliaare either limited or rapidly closing. Conditions 1 and 2 are individually necessary; totion, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combining the factors of perceived physgether they provide sufficient conditions for group flight. According to Janis and Leventhal ical danger and the location of attachment figures results in a four-fold typology that en- (1968) , "It is this combination of cognitions, whether or not they are correct inferences compasses a broad spectrum of collective responses to threat and disaster. Implications about the situation . . . designated as 'perceived entrapment,' which is most likely to of the social attachment model for predicting community responses to terrorist attacks and/ lead to wild flight, trampling of fellow victims, and other uncontrollable, distraught reactions or the use of weapons of mass destruction are briefly discussed.
of the type referred to as panic" (p. 1061).
A specific belief in danger can be inferred from the circumstances of many instances of TERMINOLOGY mass flight, for example, from theater fires (Smelser, 1963, p. 151) , but the existence of The term "panic" refers to inappropriate (or excessive) fear and/or flight and highly such beliefs among participants in some cases of troop flight has been questioned. For inintense fear and/or flight. But whether defined stance, Marshall (1947) states that "every large tives and friends. Most of those who fled were either unattached to families in the area or panic starts with some very minor event . . . (T)roops will always run if they see others fled only after other family members had assembled (Cantril et al., 1940, pp. 144-146) . running and do not understand why" (p. 145). A belief in limited or closing escape routes appears This was contrary to newspaper reports at the time, of a mass exodus from New York City. to have been a necessary condition in many historic cases (Smelser, 1963, p. 137) , but some A Swedish study of responses to a radio broadcast of a fictitious radioactive leak from military panics have occurred in situations where escape routes were virtually unlimited a nuclear power plant (Rosengren, Arvidson, & Sturesson, 1975 ) involved a telephone sur- (Schultz, 1964a, p. 11 authors suggested, they were very rare. As mentioned, mass flight from the are present. Tyhurst (1951) studied reactions to community disasters and found that only scene of community disasters is uncommon. "Organized" and often altruistic behavior is 12% to 25% of adults responded by fleeing when informed that their apartment house the rule (Edwards, 1976; Feinberg & Johnson, 2001; Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002 ; Johnson, was on fire or that a flash flood was imminent. Three-quarters or more engaged in aimless 1987; Keating, 1982; Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Proulx, 2002 Proulx, , 2003 Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977 ; and irrelevant movements rather than the expected flight behavior. Schoch-Spana, 2003) . Although the conditions for flight stipulated by the theory do Convincing evidence against the theory comes from two detailed case studies specifinot exist in most disasters, in those where the conditions would be expected to prevail, such cally concerned with mass flight. The famous Orson Welles radio broadcast, "War of the as anticipated bombing raids, approaching tidal waves, or fires in high-rise buildings, Worlds," in October 1938 dramatically depicted the advance of Martians in terms of evacuation has often been minimal (Edwards, 1976; Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Lachman, Tatpartial encirclement- precisely the conditions for flight stipulated by the theory. The broadsuoka, & Bonk, 1961; Proulx, 2002) . cast occurred when radio listening was at a peak in the United States and took the form of a newscast, that is, "news" being reported
ASSUMPTIONS IN THE "ENTRAPMENT" THEORY
in a highly realistic manner. According to estimates made at the time (Cantril, Gaudet, &
OF FLIGHT
Herzog, 1940), 6 to 12 million people heard the broadcast and 28% (i.e., 2.5 million) beEarlier views of mass panic rested on the following assumptions: lieved the program was an actual newscast. Of these 2.5 million, 70% were "excited" or afraid (Lemkau, 1973) . No estimate was provided of 1. The typical response to danger is selfpreservative aggression or flight (see, for the number of persons who fled, but of those who listened to the broadcast, believed what example, Brown, 1954; Cannon, 1929; McDougall, 1920; Petersen, 1953) . they heard, and were frightened, the vast majority did not flee but instead contacted relaAccording to McDougall (1920) , "(T)he sudden appearance of immiimity of familiar conspecifics and places, even if this involves remaining in or approaching a nent danger may instantaneously convert any concourse of people into a situation of danger (Baker & Chapman, 1962; Henderson, 1977; Kinston & Rosser, 1974) . crowd and produce the characteristic and terrible phenomena of a panic. Bowlby (1973, p. 91) has suggested that attachment behavior serves the evolutionaryIn each man, the instinct of fear is intensely excited; he experiences that adaptive function of providing protection from natural predators, and notes that in horrible emotion in full force and is irresistibly impelled to save himself by young animals of many species, attachment behavior frequently takes precedence over esflight" (p. 24).
Flight is directed toward an objectively
cape. Both Cantril et al. (1940) and Rosengren et al. (1975) , in their studies of responses to safe place, away from danger. In his classic text on collective behavior, Smelser threatening radio broadcasts, found that individuals sought out loved ones and only fled (1963) defined panic as "collective flight based on a hysterical belief," when all family members had assembled. In the devastating Southeast Michigan Flintand asserted that when people have accepted a "belief about some generBeecher tornado of June 1953, people tended to turn to and protect loved ones rather than alized threat [they] flee from established patterns of social interaction in flee from the threat (Form & Nosow, 1958, pp. 26-27) . Studies of behavior in structural order to preserve life, property, or power from that threat" (p. 131).
fires likewise show that occupants tend to converge and cluster (Bryan, 1985 (Bryan, , 1986 (Bryan, , 2002 ). Quarantelli (1957) also noted the typically short duration of flight and sugGovernments and other official organizations have great difficulty getting people to gested that this related directly to the individual's perception of having evacuate before and during disasters; "traditional family ties often keep individual memreached a safe distance from the threat. 3. Implicit in the disaster literature is bers in the danger zone until it is too late" (Hill & Hansen, 1962, p. 217) . In England that physical dangers are more disturbing or stressful than other kinds of events.
during World War II, evacuation programs were seriously hampered because parents pre-4. Flight is prevented from occurring in danger situations by social control in the ferred to keep their children with them at home in the cities rather than send them away form of regimentation, discipline, firm leadership (Boring, 1945, p. 456;  to the safety of the countryside (Titmuss, 1950) . Studies indicate that most residents Kelland, 1930; LaPiere, 1938; L'Etang, 1966; Rickman, 1938) , and other tend to remain in the disaster area, while those who flee are unattached to the area (Cantril et social norms (Smelser, 1963, pp. 157-163) that take effect by regulating or al., 1940, pp. 144-146; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977) . When residents are forced to evacuate, constraining the individual's natural tendency to flee. they tend to do so as a group (e.g., Cantril et al., 1940; Freeman & Cooper, 1940) or in family units (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977) , thereby maintaining proximity and contact
RESPONSE TO THREAT
with familiars. Remaining close to companions in combat is also more important to the Evidence suggests that each of the above assumptions is questionable.
individual than avoiding enemy fire (Marshall, 1947, p. 195 ). 1. Self-Preservative Flight. Human beings under threat of death are not motivated 2. Direction of Flight. Flight is not always directed toward an objectively safe place, away by a simple drive for physical safety. Rather than fight or flight, the typical response to from danger, but tends to be part of a wider response that simultaneously involves movedanger is affiliation, that is, seeking the prox-ment away from danger and movement toappearance of new types of weapon on the battlefield, explosions, flooding, disease epiward objects and situations that are familiar and perceived as safe. Studies of young animals demics, military invasion, and the like. Predisposing conditions implicated in cases of mass and children indicate that flight is usually directed not simply away from danger but toflight (Schultz, 1965; Strauss, 1944) include fatigue, illness, malnutrition, and excessive ward familiar conspecifics and places. In many species, "to move away from an alarming situheat or cold (Boring, 1945; Dollard, 1944; Lang & Lang, 1961; Meerloo, 1950) , as well ation is . . . only half the picture of fear behavior. The other half is to move towards some as psychosocial factors such as isolation, poor morale, loss of confidence in leaders, and the place treated as though safe or to make physical contact with companions" (Bowlby, 1973, absence of leaders or companions (Boring, 1945; Janis, 1963; Lang & Lang, 1961; Marp. 129 ). Salzen (1978) also suggests that flight or escape serves to move organisms from areas shall, 1947; Meerloo, 1950; Quarantelli, 1954 Quarantelli, , 1957 Quarantelli, , 1977 Schultz, 1964b Schultz, , 1971a . of strange to areas of familiar stimulation, and Gray (1971) hypothesizes that active avoidAttachment behavior is similarly elicited by alarming events such as the appearance ance behavior is motivated by the search for, and reinforced by, the attainment of "safety of unfamiliar persons, by strange and unfamiliar surroundings (Bowlby, 1969, p. 259 ; signals" in the environment.
In the classic cases of flight from the- Bowlby, 1973, pp. 96-123) , as well as by the predisposing conditions listed above: fatigue, aters and other buildings, where escape seems to be the single overriding motive, little conhunger, ill-health, cold, and actual or threatened separation (Alloway, Pliner, & Krames, sideration has been given to the sequelae and directionality of flight. Although the initial 1977; Bowlby, 1969, p. 259; Bowlby, 1973) . 3. Physical versus Psychosocial Stress. response to sudden danger may be unidirectional escape, the immediately subsequent rePhysical danger, as a whole, appears to be far less disturbing or stressful than separation sponse is to contact relatives and friends by telephone or by going home, as soon as the from familiar conspecifics and surroundings ( Janis & Leventhal, 1968 , pp. 1061 -1064 ; individuals concerned can do so. In general, evacuees orient themselves in the direction of Kinston & Rosser, 1974; Edwards, 1976) . During the bombing raids on London in relatives whose homes are outside the danger area (Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Moore, Bates, World War II, children showed no particular signs of distress, even if exposed to extremely Laymon, & Parenton, 1963, p. 57) . Evacuating families forced to go to official evacuation violent scenes, if they were with a parent during such incidents. It was only if children were sites tend to form clusters that partially duplicate their old neighborhoods , separated from parents under these conditions that serious psychological disturbances ocsuggesting an "intention to restore the familiar in the midst of unfamiliar surroundings" curred (Freud & Burlingham, 1945) , suggesting that disruption of the family bond was a (Bolin, 1976, p. 268) . Affiliative behavior continues at a high level of intensity after disasters more traumatic factor than the air raids (Glover, 1942) . Glass (1954) similarly found involving escape behavior, and after disasters in general (Bloch, Silber, & Perry, 1956; New- that only 15% of psychiatric casualties evacuated from battle zones and, given intensive man, 1976). Interactions with family members are also more frequent up to three years after psychotherapy, could subsequently be returned to combat. If these men were kept in disasters Bolin, 1976; Drabek & Key, 1976; Erickson, 1977 Erickson, , 1995 .
the battle zones with their own units, the rate of return to combat was much higher. In anaAll of the conditions known to elicit flight in humans also elicit attachment behavlyzing the social and psychological effects of tornado disasters, Moore (1958) found more ior (Bowlby, 1969) . Precipitating conditions for flight include "alarming events" of many diffrequent symptoms of disturbance among persons forced to move because of serious damage ferent kinds (Schultz, 1965) such as fires, the to their homes than among those who were 170) or if morale is high (LaPiere, 1938, pp. 458-459) . Conversely, being alone, in an unfaable to remain. Non-returning evacuees experience significantly more fearful reactions, inmiliar environment, or with strangers heightens the response to stress (Back & Bogdonoff, juries, and other problems than those remaining in the disaster area (Milne, 1977a , b). In 1964 Edwards, 1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan, Cassel, & Gore, 1977 ; Kinston & general, separation from or the loss of familiar persons and surroundings has profoundly ad- Rosser, 1974) and increases the probability of flight (Keegan, 1976, p. 271; Lanham, 1943) . verse effects on mental and physical health (DeVries, Glasper, & Detillion, 2003; Erickson, 1977; Henderson, 1977 ; Jacobs & Ost-THE RARITY OF FLIGHT feld, 1977; Lynch, 1998; Rutter, 1972) .
IN COMMUNITY DISASTERS

Prevention of Panic. The rarity of mass
AND COMBAT
flight among combat troops has often been attributed to regimental discipline and firm Flight is said to be rare in these situaleadership, but social control in the form of tions because the necessary and sufficient concoercion does not account for persistent comditions (belief in imminent danger and limited bat effectiveness in the face of danger (Keegan, escape routes) do not usually hold, and be-1976, p. 277). Individuals of many species ofcause social controls are operative. However, ten remain calm and unafraid in danger situaflight does not always occur even when both tions, an effect that seems to depend largely conditions appear to be present. As we have on the immediate social context; that is, indiseen, physical danger tends to elicit approach viduals are calmed by the presence of attachto familiar persons and places; most disasters ment objects, while the reverse is true if they tend to occur in familiar surroundings; and are alone, with strangers, or in unfamiliar surboth disaster victims (and troops in the combat roundings (Bovard, 1959; Bowlby, 1973, p. zone) tend to be with individuals to whom 297; DeVries et al., 2003; Epley, 1974; Gun- they are attached. Hence, affiliative "bunchnar, 1998; Kamarck, Annunziato, & Amateau, ing" in the danger zone would be the expected 1995).
outcome rather than flight. The rarity of flight Fighting effectiveness and the willingin community disasters and combat may also ness to engage in combat depend on the estabbe explained by the fact that both the appraisal lishment and maintenance of "primary group" of and response to danger are diminished by relations between officers and men rather than the presence of attachment objects, as noted on loyalty to political ideals or fear (Grinker above. The observations that visitors tend to & Spiegel, 1945; Janis, 1963; Marshall, 1947: be the ones to flee disaster areas, and that 150; Phillips, 1943; Shils & Janowitz, 1948;  "panic" is more common in recently assemStouffer et al., 1949). As Marshall (1947) elobled than in long-established military units quently states: "I hold it to be one of the (Shils & Janowitz, 1948) can be explained by simplest truths of war that the thing which the fact that the persons concerned are in unenables an infantry soldier to keep going is familiar territory and with comparative strangthe presence of a comrade . . . The other man ers, and would thus be expected to have an may be almost beyond hailing distance, but increased tendency for flight-and-affiliation to he must be there somewhere within a man's their own objects of attachment and familiar consciousness or the onset of demoralization locations. is almost immediate . . ." (p. 17). Morale surveys conducted in World War II showed that Explaining the Occurrence many soldiers were reluctant to be allocated of Flight in Non-Threatening to other units because they felt safer with their Situations own group ( Janis, 1963) . The most extreme stresses, including drowning at sea, can be Collective flight on the battlefield has been precipitated by the appearance of new calmly faced if the individual is not separated from his fellows (Burns & Kimura, 1963, p. types of weapons (Auld, 1918; Meerloo, 1950, p. 49) . However, flight can occur in the abof misgivings about him . . ." (Freud, 1922, p. 29) , or because of the flight of a leader, entailsence of danger and in situations where escape routes are virtually unlimited (Freud, 1922;  ing the break-up of affectional ties (Schultz, 1964b) . As a result, the individual flees because Marshall, 1947; Schultz, 1964a , p. 11). Marshall (1947 1963; Little, 1964; Sohlberg, 1976; Stouffer et al., 1949; Teichman, 1977) . The threat of Smelser proposes that those who ran after seeing others doing so believed that danseparation is also a major determinant of affiliative behavior as well as a common experience ger was imminent and that escape routes were closing. This explanation cannot be entirely on the battlefield (Dasberg, 1976, p. 311) , and there is much evidence that attachment behavdiscounted. However, the explanation dwells exclusively on what the initial flight means to ior occurs under such conditions. Individual soldiers try to avoid being separated; they will the observer in terms of objective dangers to be anticipated rather than what it means in go through danger to be reunited with their unit, and tend to bunch together in combat light of the observer's relationship to the fleeing individual(s), and it underemphasizes the nu- (Marshall, 1947, p. 340) . ances of meaning that can arise when one or more men, in whom confidence and trust have THE SOCIAL ATTACHMENT been placed, behave contrary to expectations.
MODEL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
A second hypothesis begins with the
IN DISASTERS
observation that strong affectional ties existing between the members of most military The social attachment model (Mawson, 1978 (Mawson, , 1980 represents a synthesis of the above units make the danger of combat seem relatively slight. Panic arises because of the "loss observations and conclusions. Its central tenets are as follows: of the leader in some sense or other, the birth 1) Maintaining proximity to familiars is flight-and-affiliation depends largely on the severity of predisposing conditions. If precipitatthe dominant motive in disasters, an intense expression of the fundamening and predisposing conditions are subdivided, respectively, into two extremes-"anxiety vertally gregarious nature of human beings.
sus fear or terror" and "attachment figures present/absent"-a fourfold typology of progres-2) Flight can be considered the reverse side of the coin of affiliative behavior, sively more intense responses emerges (labeled Outcomes A, B, C, and D) that incorporates a that is, one aspect of a more general response that involves movement wide spectrum of collective reactions to threats and disasters (Figure 1 ). away from danger and toward people and places viewed as familiar.
Outcome A-Affiliation 3) The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation depends not only on the perWhere the level of physical danger is low (causing anxiety) and individuals are in ceived degree of danger but, more importantly, on the social context, that the presence of attachment figures or objects, the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is high, is, the location or whereabouts of familiar persons and places.
and flight from the vicinity is rare; the usual outcome is increased attachment behavior. This 4) The presence of familiar persons influences the perception of and response is the most common response to community threats and disasters. Individuals tend to conto danger, in that fear is diminished by proximity to attachment figures. tact relatives and friends and/or remain together at home. Other examples of Outcome a. In situations where individuals are close to attachment figures, not A are increased bunching activity among troops in the combat zone, and the myriad even the most severe environmental threats ordinarily cause flight; everyday instances of attachment behavior shown by children and adults in the face of the usual outcome is intense affiliative behavior.
mild threats (e.g., calling or going home). b. On the rare occasions when flight Outcome B-Orderly Evacuation does occur, individuals tend to by Non-Residents move away as a group, thereby maintaining proximity with atWhere the degree of danger is low, but individuals are alone or with strangers, the tachment figures. c. However, in situations where the threshold for flight-and-affiliation is still relatively low, and flight-and-affiliation of low intenindividual is alone or with strangers, even mild threats can precipitate sity would be expected to occur. Such behavior is often described not as panic but as orderly flight-and-affiliation to familiar persons and locations at a distance. flight or evacuation. Exemplifying Outcome B would be the flight-and-affiliative behavior of those temporarily away from home towards their own homes and families. At this level of
TYPOLOGY OF RESPONSES TO DISASTER
perceived danger (which tends to be minimized or downplayed in the home environment), local inhabitants tend to remain in their Based on the foregoing, a typology of individual and collective reactions to threatenfamiliar environment. ing situations is proposed, combining the facOutcome C-Evacuation tors of perceived degree of physical danger by Community Residents (precipitating condition) and levels of social support available in the situation (i.e., the presence Where the danger level is high (intense fear or terror) but people are with familiars, or absence of attachment objects) (predisposing condition). Whether a particular threat leads to flight-and-affiliation occurs occasionally in spite of exceptionally strong bonds to persons and hand, in the case of fires occurring in familiar locations such office buildings (and especially places in the danger zone. In such cases, individuals tend to evacuate as a group, either homes), people would be expected to show a tendency to increase their attachment behavas families or neighborhood groups, thereby keeping close together. The intensity of egress ior within the structure (Outcome A) rather than evacuating it (Outcome C). Affiliative depends on the magnitude and imminence of the threat. Examples of Outcome C include tendencies would presumably be shown particularly strongly by children in their own occasional "panics" in seasoned military units in the face of overwhelming or unexpected homes, and perhaps also by the frail elderly. In fact, research is needed to determine whether danger, and large-scale community evacuations during major fires or other disasters.
young children are more apt to engage in attachment behavior under such conditions and whether this may account, in part, for the Outcome D-Intense Flightand-Affiliation increased susceptibility of children to injury and death in residential fires. In residential fires in general, the model would predict a) Where the danger level is high (inducing fear or terror) and individuals are either numerous manifestations of attachment behavior to persons and places within the strucalone or with strangers, flight-and-affiliative behavior of high intensity would be expected to ture, b) a widespread tendency to downplay the danger, c) a general reluctance to evacuate, occur. This response is often described as "mass panic." Examples include the classic, entrapd) prolonged delays in departure, and e) far less precipitous and intense escape behavior ment-type "panics," together with cases of flight-and-affiliation in combat units where than if the fire had occurred in an unfamiliar location. Several observations on behavior attachments between individuals are either weak or nonexistent and where, in effect, each during and after a fire in an apartment building in Winnipeg, Canada, support these predicperson experiences the stress of combat as an isolated individual. In these types of situations, tions (Scanlon, 1979): flight-and-affiliation sometimes takes the
• "former residents could not resist wandform of highly individualistic and competitive ering back to the abandoned building"; behavior. However, such behavior can be
• "44 percent of the occupants said that viewed as an attempt to seek proximity and when the alarm was sounded they ascontact with distant attachment objects. Imsumed it was a false alarm"; mediately or very shortly after vacating a
• "Many of those who reacted to the burning building, individuals attempt to conalarm . . . went looking for confirmatact relatives and/or go "home", that is, seek tory evidence of a fire"; the familiar.
• "Despite the evidence of their own senses, some people decided not to evacuate immediately . . . more than
BEHAVIOR IN
half took their time leaving";
STRUCTURAL FIRES
• "Some people, despite hearing an alarm, carried on with incredibly inappropriate Aspects of the typology can be illusbehavior and took enormous risks"; trated by noting the importance of the social
• "Many people wandered around in the context in understanding collective responses building before they finally left"; and to different types of structural fire. In the case
• "One in six people who left the buildof fires in theaters and clubs, people generally ing, in spite of seeing smoke and flames encounter danger in an unfamiliar place, surwhile they were in the open, went back rounded by unfamiliar people. Intense flightinside." and-affiliation to attachment objects outside the theater (Outcome D) would therefore be In his review of the literature on behavior in fire, Bryan (1986) cites numerous obserthe expected behavior pattern. On the other vations consistent with social attachment direction of movement in the area was based on a combination of the person's role (and theory.
hence familiarity with a particular escape route), affiliative ties to individuals who were in another location in the building, and conse-
RESEARCH ON THE SOCIAL ATTACHMENT MODEL
quent proximity to one exit or the other. The contribution of group ties to deaths and injuries resulting from the Summerland fire was The social attachment ("affiliative") model of group behavior in emergencies has also analyzed by Sime. He found that all of the 13 people in the MSB who died were been formally tested in a number of studies. Noting that the "panic model" assumes that attached to their groups when alerted to the fire, but "[t]hese groups evidently delayed escape involves a homogeneous mass of people competing for limited exits, whereas the "affiltheir departure. In trying to escape in groups . . . these people were caught by the encroachiative" model predicts that individuals with close ties first seek and find each other and ing smoke and flames" (Sime, 1983, p. 38) . Affiliative behavior increased the danger to the then attempt to escape as a group, Sime (1983 Sime ( , 1985 studied responses to fire in a large resort family groups because the latter were slower to escape. On the other hand, separated individcomplex (Summerland) in the United Kingdom based on accounts collected from 500 uals were quicker to respond to the ambiguous cues by escape behavior and hence none was survivors. About 3,000 vacationers were present and 50 people died. Accounts of the fire seriously injured. Thus, group ties and affiliative patterns of behavior in entrapment situaand behavior in the fire, collected from survivors by the police, formed the basis of the tions created by building fires can increase the risk of injury and death to attached individuals study. This was a classic entrapment situation in which a complete breakdown of psychologiby delaying their departure. In a study of the evacuation behavior of cal ties would have been expected on the "panic" model. However, about 50 percent of occupants of the former World Trade Center following the explosion on February 26, 1993, those in the sample who were initially separated from primary group members managed based on interviews with 350 participants, Aguirre, Wenger, & Vigo (1998) found that to escape with the rest of their primary group, and 73 percent escaped with one or more evacuating groups comprising a high proportion of acquainted persons with deep social ties group members (79 percent were members of families). Consistent with the social attachwere the slowest to begin evacuating. Other research consistently shows that people are ment model, mixed-group members were less likely to stay together in intact groups while slow to react to initial warnings and wait to evacuate with their primary group (Fitzpatrick escaping, and separated individuals did not try to re-form into intact groups unless they had & Mileti, 1991; Perry, 1994) . In high-rise buildings, a lethargic reaction is usually obfamily group attachments somewhere in the building. Supporting the notion that moveserved in response to fire alarms, voice communication instructions, or even initial cues ment toward familiar persons and places characterizes flight behavior, most of those studied of a fire, and occupants are generally reluctant to leave their floor (Proulx, 1999) . headed toward the familiar main entrance. A detailed analysis of behavior in one area of the In the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Southgate, Kentucky, in May 1977, which building (Marquee Show Bar-MSB) showed that individuals who were separated from their resulted in 165 fatalities, social ties existing among the occupants of the club (family, sogroup had positioned themselves near, and left near, the entrance they were familiar with; cial, and occupational ties) profoundly influenced behavior in the fire. A high level of restaurant staff left by their familiar route to work (the fire exit staircase); and most of the assistance and civility was shown to others, and it was concluded that the data supported separated individuals had positioned themselves close to the familiar entrance. Thus, the a "social organization" rather than a "social breakdown" model of behavior in fire (Feinneed to reassess their assumptions about the public's capacity to respond constructively berg & Johnson, 2001; Johnson, 1988) .
When the M/V Estonia car ferry sank after a terrorist attack" (Schoch-Spana, 2003, p. 132) . in 1994, 851 passengers and crew died and only 137 (14%) survived. The high fatality rate was due to the rapid sinking of the vessel, coupled with physical barriers to escape RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR ATTACK caused by severe listing. This made it virtually impossible for family members or the crew to help one another. However, eyewitIt is uncertain how the general population would respond to an unprecedented act ness testimony revealed that people tried to form human chains by holding on to one of terrorism using biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombings of Hianother's legs in the struggle to reach the upper deck, and great efforts were made to roshima and Nagasaki in 1945 may provide a guideline. Some reports gave accounts of provide mutual aid. There were also many accounts of men fleeing with wives, mothers, confusion, hysteria, and mass flight (U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946, p. 28 ; Avalon or girlfriends, and of people attempting to stay together during the escape (Cornwell et Project, 1996 ; however, these were not the typical behavioral responses of al. , 2001) .
Following the more recent attack on survivors. Both cities were evacuated due to hazardous conditions resulting from radioacthe World Trade Center in September 11, 2001, 480 first-person accounts were collected tive substances in the immediate environment, but initial evacuations by survivors were carfrom survivors about their evacuation, of which 324 accounts were available for analysis (Proulx, ried out calmly and in an organized way. The unexpected calmness of disaster victims has 2003). As many as 83 percent judged the situation to be very serious in the first few minutes been termed "post-disaster utopia" (Cuthbertson & Nigg, 1987, pp. 444-462) . As in most after the strike. Yet despite seeing flames, smoke, or falling paper, only 55 percent of the disasters, people expressed a longing for the familiarity of home and sought out other sursurvivors evacuated immediately; another 13 percent stopped to retrieve belongings, and vivors. One woman stated that "she struggled to her feet and joined a band of other survivors 20 percent secured files and searched floors before evacuating. Initially, eight percent de-. . . . Home, she had to get home . . ." (Kurzman, 1986, pp. 14, 413-114) . Survivors were cided to stay but changed their minds, and four percent were trapped due to collapsing described as attempting to leave the city to get to the suburbs, but most people lived in ceiling and walls, but then managed to escape. Many commented on how calm and helpful the suburbs and were trying to get home. They were seeking the familiar rural or suburthe occupants were during the evacuation (http://irc.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca).
ban communities where they lived and where the bombs' effects were not felt. "All the peoOther reviews of behavior following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and ple were going in that direction and so I suppose I was taken into this movement and went Pentagon and the subsequent anthrax letter mailings (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; with them," said one survivor, implying that many people assembled into groups and evacSpana, 2003) similarly discounted long-held views that terrorist attacks would cause mass uated in an organized manner (Lifton, 1967, pp. 20, 21-40) . Similar accounts of responses panic and social disorder (DiGiovanni, 1999; Stern, 1999; WHO, 1970) . On the contrary, a to the bombings were given, mentioning acts of bravery and the strong sense of companionbroad range of positive public responses were noted, including rescue work, volunteering, ship that developed among the survivors as they came together and returned to their providing resources, and donating blood, indicating that "health and safety professionals homes (Barker, 1985; Linner, 1995; Wyden, 1984, p. 255) . Many hibakushas (survivors of toward other situations that are perceived as familiar but which may not necessarily be obthe atomic bomb) related their experiences on a video (Hiroshima Witness, 1990) produced by jectively safe. We have suggested that some military "panics" occurring in the apparent the Hiroshima Peace Cultural Center. These graphic personal descriptions of events in Auabsence of physical threat or danger, but triggered by the sudden departure of one or more gust 1945 show that although most survivors were terrified and in a state of shock, their men to the rear, may in fact be affiliative responses to the perceived threat of abandonoverriding goal was to be reunited with familiar people and surroundings. One witness, ment by or separation from comrades. The occurrence of flight-and-affiliation Hiroko Fukada, stated that he "went out of the building because I thought it would be depends mainly on the social context and, more particularly, on the whereabouts of fadangerous to stay inside. Soon I found soldiers walking in this direction. I was with my friends miliar persons (i.e., attachment figures); their presence has a calming effect and reduces the and we thought it would be safe to go with soldiers, and so we (did) . . ." This account probability of flight-and-affiliation, while their absence has the opposite effect. Combining shows neither hysteria nor panic but calm decision-making and a desire for companionthe factors of perceived physical danger and the location of attachment figures, and categoship.
rizing them respectively as "mild/severe" (i.e., anxiety versus fear or terror) and "present/ absent," results in a fourfold typology that CONCLUSIONS encompasses a wide spectrum of collective responses to threat and disaster. Until recently, mass panic (and/or violence) was thought to be the natural response Studies of collective behavior in disasters thus show that fear tends to be minimal to physical danger and perceived entrapment. However, contrary to the "panic" or social and expressions of mutual aid predominate. On the negative side, however, people in groups breakdown model of collective behavior, the typical response to a variety of threats and of familiars are generally slow to react to initial warnings, slow to leave work areas, and wait disasters is not to flee or attack but rather affiliation, that is, to seek the proximity of to assemble with their primary group before evacuating. Thus, evacuation may be so defamiliar persons and places; moreover, separation from attachment figures is a greater layed that survival is threatened. In certain situations, such as structural fires, the tenstressor than physical danger. Multiple social ties existing among participants in disaster sitdency to seek the familiar in the face of imminent physical danger can have disastrous conuations profoundly influence behavior. Men flee with their wives, families, or girlfriends, sequences in terms of increasing the risk of severe injury or death. Ironically, because and attempt to stay together during escapes. Nor do employees abandon their responsibilitendencies toward hysteria and mass panic on the part of the public are widely assumed, ties toward patrons. A high degree of civility is shown, and heroic efforts are made to provide officials are often reluctant to issue warnings, or delay doing so, for fear of causing panic mutual aid and assistance.
Such observations can be understood in (Sime, 1980 ). Yet delays in providing correct or sufficient information can result in entrapterms of an alternative, "social attachment" model of behavior that recognizes the fundament and death as a result of inactivity or active attachment behavior. Thus, from a pubmentally gregarious nature of human beings and the primacy of attachments. In the relalic health or safety point of view, the problem in disasters is not that people tend to panic tively rare instances where flight does occur, the latter can be viewed as one aspect of a and act precipitously in response to danger, but that people typically delay or fail to take more general affiliative response that involves escaping from certain situations and moving appropriate evasive action when it is needed.
In recent decades, there has been an which attachments are essential for normal human growth, development, and social funcexplosion of research interest in human bonds and the way in which they modulate the effects tioning as well as health and longevity. We have seen that close personal relaof environmental stress and influence health and social behavior (Beatson & Taryan, 2003;  tionships strongly determine individual and collective responses to threat, but the policy Berkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000; Bowlby, 1969 Bowlby, , 1973 Brown et al., 1975; Cobb, implications of the social attachment model for public health and safety remain largely 1976; Henderson, 1977; Kaplan et al., 1977; Kiritz & Moos, 1974) . Under a variety of unexplored, for example, with respect to fire safety and all aspects of preparedness, includstressful conditions, individuals approach familiar persons and places and are calmed by ing counterterrorism. It remains now to apply the social attachment model of behavior in their presence. In sociological terms, there is an increase in "we-feeling," solidarity and modisaster, as well as observations indicating that people generally show an unexpectedly strong rale, but also a parallel increased sensitivity to perceived deviance and a tendency toward capacity to organize and respond positively and unselfishly under such conditions, such social exclusion, scapegoating, and hate crime (Taintor, 2003) . The study of responses to as, providing valuable back-services for overworked "first-responders." As recently emphastress thus provides clues for understanding human bonds and behavior, the dynamics of sized (Glass & Schoch-Spana, 2002; SchochSpana, 2003 ; http://www.upmc-biosecurity. which are more difficult to observe under nonemergency conditions. Collective social pheorg/pages/events/peoplesrole/ursano/ursano_ trans.html), these findings need to be incorponomena, long considered a backwater of sociology, can be seen as continuous with-and as rated into new models of health education and promotion so that community ties and illustrating-a broader model of human social behavior that emphasizes the primacy of atstrengths can be actively harnessed by public health and other governmental agencies to tachments, not in the Durkheimian sense (Mawson, 1970) , in which social relationships prepare and respond more effectively to future disasters and possible terrorist attack. "restrain" an inherently selfish human nature, but in a profoundly interactionist sense in
